jueves, 2 de mayo de 2024

Britain and migration

 

Britain is the best place in Europe to be an immigrant

What other countries can learn from its example

The Economist, Mar 21st 2024

The idea of Britain as a nation of immigration might seem counterintuitive. Its citizens voted to leave the European Union in 2016 after they were promised a tighter chokehold on inflows of people from Europe. This week politicians in Parliament tussled over a bill that will make it easier to ship asylum-seekers to Rwanda without hearing their pleas—the latest in a string of illiberal laws designed to “stop the boats”.

Neither does the country crow about the migrants it has. Other places have grand immigration museums; the one in New York harbour draws millions of tourists each year. Britain’s small Migration Museum, which was founded not by the state but by some worthies, sits in Lewisham Shopping Centre in south London, between a discount store and a shoe shop.

Yet Britain now has a larger share of foreign-born residents than America. One in six of its inhabitants began life in another country. The share is rising because, even as it strains to stop the boats, the Conservative government has opened the door to workers, students and selected victims of authoritarianism such as Hong Kongers and Ukrainians. Asylum is a sideshow in terms of the numbers. Fewer than 30,000 people floated across the English Channel last year. Long-term immigration in the year to June 2023 stood at 1.2m.

More surprising still is the fact that the country is so good at assimilating immigrants. Angsty politicians gripe that Britain is letting in people from poor countries to do menial jobs, and weak students who want visas only so they can deliver pizzas. Multiculturalism has failed, they say: too many immigrants live parallel lives in segregated neighbourhoods. Nonsense: Britain excels at getting foreigners up to speed economically, socially and culturally. It is (in this respect, at least) a model for the rest of the world.

In many countries even skilled immigrants struggle to find jobs. In the eu foreign-born adults with degrees who are not still in education have an employment rate ten percentage points lower than natives with degrees. In Britain the gap is a trivial two points, and scantily educated foreign-born people are 12 points more likely to work than their British-born peers.

Even immigrants stuck in dull jobs know that their children tend to fare well in school. In England teenagers who do not speak English as their first language are more likely to obtain good grades in maths and English in national gcse exams than native English-speakers. The pisa tests run by the oecd, a rich-country club, show that immigrants and their children perform badly in much of Europe. In Germany immigrants’ children scored 436 points in the latest maths test, against 495 for natives. In Britain they did slightly better than natives.

The idea that Britain is dividing into ghettos is a myth. Every ethnic group has consistently become less segregated since the census started keeping track in 1991. The foreign-born population is growing fastest not in traditional melting-pots such as Birmingham and inner London but in staid suburbs and smallish towns. Even within those towns, foreigners do not cluster together.

It is true that immigration remains the subject of furious political debate. But that is probably because the people who really dislike it are prepared to base their voting decisions on this issue alone. Britons as a whole have become more relaxed, especially since the Brexit vote. They seem unfussed by one remarkable recent development. The top political jobs in Britain, Scotland and London are all held by the children of immigrants, all of South Asian descent. The first ministers of Northern Ireland and Wales were born abroad (although Michelle O’Neill only moved north from Ireland).

Britain cannot turn every migrant and every migrant’s child into well-educated, productive members of society. It struggles with imported prejudices and aggressive Islamism, although that problem is sadly often home-grown. Asylum-seekers do not adjust as well as others, possibly because the government crams them into hotels and prevents them from working while it sluggishly gets round to hearing their cases. Nor is the state good at bureaucracy. The Home Office is famously incompetent. It actually retards assimilation by charging so much for naturalisation—in real terms the cost has increased by six times since 2000.

Moreover, Britain has a couple of advantages that other countries cannot replicate. It is a long way from a war zone, so it gets relatively few uninvited refugees, and it happens to use a language that lots of people speak a little. But two other explanations for its success are easier for others to copy.

The first is Britain’s flexible labour market. Compared with the rest of Europe, hiring and firing is straightforward, even for people who are employed under regular contracts. That helps immigrants find an economic foothold, which makes everything else easier. Xenophobic credentialism is weaker. One unusual thing about Britain is that immigrants with foreign qualifications have almost exactly the same employment rate as those with domestic qualifications. In most European countries the gap is large; in Greece it is an amazing 25 percentage points.

Ghetto fabulists

The country’s other advantage is the attitude of its people. Britons are open-minded. Just 5% told the World Values Survey that they would object to living next to an immigrant (and migrants’ children report being bullied at school less often than natives’ children). Britons combine an intolerance for discrimination with high expectations. Compared with other Europeans, they are keen for migrants to learn the language, obtain qualifications, adopt the culture and become citizens. It probably helps that Britain never had guest workers. But politicians elsewhere would be wise not to predict that newcomers it has accepted will one day go home, as Angela Merkel, then Germany’s chancellor, said of refugees in 2016.

Britain has not been an obvious country to copy recently. Its major service to the rest of Europe has been to show the costs of leaving the eu. But on integration it is the place to beat.

 

America vs. Europe

 

Working from home and the US-Europe divide

Americans are no longer the rich world’s great office drones

The Economist. May 1st 2024

When it comes to economic growth, America comfortably beats Europe. Many factors have fed America’s outperformance, from tech innovation to vast oil reserves. But there is one explanation that seems almost too simplistic: that “Americans just work harder”, as the head of Norway’s oil fund put it in an interview with the Financial Times on April 24th.

The numbers do in fact bear out this assertion—a rare case of national stereotypes being empirically provable. On average Americans work 1,811 hours per year, according to data from the oecd, a club of mostly rich countries. That is 15% more than in the eu, where the average is 1,571 hours. And it is not just that Europeans spend a few extra weeks on the beach. The typical working day in Britain, France and Germany is half an hour shorter than in America, according to the International Labour Organisation.

Observing these differences, it is natural to ask which is the better way of living—with more money or more free time? The reality is that it is difficult for people to choose. Those in America work according to American schedules; those in Europe conform to European norms. Analytically, the more fruitful question is why Americans put in longer hours. The answer leads to a curious new observation: that remote work is making America’s office drones a little more European, albeit with a puritanical twist.

A first guess suggests that culture might account for the variation in work hours. Maybe Europeans enjoy their leisure more. They are spoilt for choice about how to spend time off, with beautiful cities, culinary delights, rugged mountains and much else besides just a short train ride or discount flight away. America might simply have less to offer travellers, and what it does have is spread over a much bigger area, which goes some way to explain why Europe draws about 150m tourists from abroad a year, twice as many as America. As for Americans, surveys indicate that they view hard work as intrinsically worthwhile. “Rugged individualism” is, after all, what built the country.

But the difficulty with chalking up the difference to culture is that until the early 1970s many Europeans worked more. American working hours are basically the same now as back then. The big change is that Europeans now toil less. Hours are down a whopping 30% in Germany over the past half-century. Something beyond culture—a slow-moving, ill-defined variable—is at play.

Edward Prescott, an American economist, came to a provocative conclusion, arguing that the key was taxation. Until the early 1970s tax levels were similar in America and Europe, and so were hours worked. By the early 1990s Europe’s taxes had become more burdensome and, in Prescott’s view, its employees less motivated. A substantial gap persists today: American tax revenue is 28% of gdp, compared with 40% or so in Europe.

But the effect of taxation on work is far from straightforward. Some workers may respond to lower taxes by putting in longer hours, knowing that they can take more money home. Others, by contrast, may decide that the additional post-tax earnings allow them to work less and still enjoy their desired lifestyles. A recent study by Jósef Sigurdsson of Stockholm University examined how Icelandic workers responded to a one-year income-tax holiday in 1987, when the country overhauled its tax system. Although people with more flexibility—especially younger ones in part-time jobs—did indeed put in more hours, the overall increase in work was modest relative to that implied by Prescott’s model.

Regulation seems to matter more. European rules give workers power, from generous parental-leave policies to stricter laws on firing staff. Many European countries try to put caps on working time, such as France’s famous 35-hour work-week. These caps have been somewhat misguided, failing to boost employment as their proponents wished. They also have plenty of loopholes. Yet most research agrees that they have reduced work hours.

Another important relationship is that, as people get richer, they typically want to work less. A recent paper by the imf shows a remarkably strong link between gdp per person and hours worked in Europe. People in richer countries, such as the Netherlands, generally work less than those in poorer countries, such as Bulgaria. That, however, only reframes the question. Americans are wealthier than most Europeans, so why do they still work more?

Perhaps leisure is a collective-action problem. Americans may want to ask their bosses for longer holidays but are worried about being seen as slackers. A paper in 2005 by Alberto Alesina of Harvard University and colleagues argued that Europe’s stronger unions had in effect solved this collective-action problem by fighting for paid vacations, which ended up enshrined in law. America, with weaker unions, is one of the few countries with no mandatory paid vacations. Europe’s well-regulated leisure time may then beget more leisure because it is more socially acceptable, and the market responds by supplying more good ways not to work. It is a virtuous cycle of lovely cafés.

Just another day out the office

One fascinating new development is a discrepancy in the rise of remote work. In 2023 the Global Survey of Working Arrangements found that full-time employees in America work from home 1.4 days a week, while those in Europe do so for 0.8 days. Applying this home-office split to the working-hours data compiled by the oecd yields a striking result: Europeans and Americans now spend almost exactly the same amount of time in the office, with 1,320 hours a year for the former and 1,304 for the latter.

In other words, the extra 15% of work done by Americans annually is now from the comfort of their own homes—or occasionally on the beach, perhaps even one in Europe. Americans do still work harder, but rather more enjoyably than in the past. 

viernes, 12 de abril de 2024

Why most people regret Brexit: A majority of British voters now believe the split was a mistake

 

A majority of British voters now believe the split was a mistake

Apr 11th 2024| (The Economist)

It is rare for voters to change their minds soon after referendums. Experience from Canada to Scotland, from Norway to Switzerland, suggests rather that opinions tend to move in favour of a referendum result more than they swing against it. But Brexit seems to be an exception. Since the 52-48% vote in favour of leaving the European Union in June 2016, the majority view among Britons has shifted, and especially so in the past two years, towards the conclusion that the decision was wrong (see chart).



One way to take the temperature is to visit two English towns called Richmond which voted in very different ways in 2016. In Richmond-upon-Thames in London, which voted 69-31% to remain in the eu, opinion has hardened. Gareth Roberts, the Liberal Democrat council leader, notes that post-Brexit niggles such as longer border delays and more intrusive passport controls have helped to solidify local opposition. A Leave voter sitting by the river says he has not changed his mind, but that he is disappointed by the Tories’ failure to strike big trade deals outside the eu.

The other Richmond, in north Yorkshire, voted 57-43% for Brexit. One Leaver in the market square echoes his southern counterpart by insisting that he still supports Brexit but he complains that it has not been properly done and that immigration has surged despite repeated Tory promises to reduce it. A local bartender says that she voted instinctively to leave but that, were the referendum re-run, she would work harder to understand what it would really mean. Stuart Parsons, a former mayor of Richmond, claims that several friends have changed their minds, especially small farmers who feel betrayed by the Conservatives and now fret about future lost public subsidies.

Such anecdotes chime with polls across the country. Research by uk in a Changing Europe (ukice), a think-tank, finds that most voters have not in fact changed their minds since 2016. But because as many as 16-20% of those who voted to leave have switched sides, compared with only 6% of those who voted to remain, the balance has swung against Brexit. The passage of time is also having its inevitable effect: older voters were overwhelmingly keen to leave the eu and younger ones were fiercely opposed to the idea. Don’t-knows and those who did not vote in 2016 now tend to break strongly against Brexit.

Explanations abound for the disillusionment. Sir John Curtice, a leading pollster who works with ukice, points especially to gloom about the economy since 2016, which he says matters more than irritation over immigration. Sarah Olney, the Liberal Democrat mp for Richmond Park, reckons that outright dishonesty on the part of the Leave campaign is to blame. Peter Kellner, a political pundit and former president of YouGov, a polling group, suggests that many Brexit supporters had no idea what would happen if they actually won. That differs sharply from the run-up to most other constitutional referendums.

Changes in the political background matter as well. The Conservatives under Rishi Sunak, who happens to be the mp for Richmond in Yorkshire and is a keen supporter of Brexit, are associated in voters’ minds with the decision to Leave. Party disunity and the chaos of four prime ministers in five years have helped to discredit something with which the Tories are strongly identified.

Just as the Tories have helped tarnish views of Brexit, so Brexit is likely to hurt the Tories at the next election. A chunk of people who voted Leave in 2016 say there should still be long-term benefits from quitting the bloc but argue that too little has been done to realise them. This group now leans against the Tories and may even prefer the Reform Party, an insurgent right-wing party. In contrast, those who were against Brexit in 2016 think they were right to fear its economic impact; many who were Tory then now back Labour.

The anti-Brexit mood of a majority of voters is clear but that does not translate into a burning wish to refight old battles. Brexit may be unpopular but its political salience has faded. Even keen Remainers have doubts about the wisdom of starting a lengthy campaign to rejoin. The Labour Party’s decision to talk as little as possible about Brexit is understandable: the party hopes to regain “red-wall” seats in the north and the Midlands that backed Brexit in 2016 and then voted Tory in the 2019 general election.

But if and when Labour does take office, there will be political wriggle-room to improve relations with the eu. Some in the party talk not just of expanding today’s thin trade deal but of broader alignment with European rules. Tory attacks on such ideas as a betrayal of the 2016 vote are less likely to resonate when Brexit itself has lost its appeal for many.

miércoles, 10 de mayo de 2023

The many crises of Europe (and possible solutions)

Intro: 3 versions of Europe are collapsing at the same time


PROBLEMS:

1. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/five-reasons-why-europe-is-cracking-up/

2. http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/01/europe-terrorism-migrants-debt-crisis

3. http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35060225

4. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/07/anti-europe-parties-arent-anti-europe-anymore/

5. http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europe_under_pressure_to_act

6. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/25/refugee-crisis-european-union

7. Coronavirus: https://www.ecfr.eu/coronavirus,  https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_shared_goals_how_germanys_crisis_response_could_strengthen_europ

SOLUTIONS:

The Appeal of 9 May: https://wakeupeurope.eu/2016/06/10/roadmap-for-a-new-european-renaissance-appeal-of-9th-may/

Six Ideas to Save Europe: http://thebaladeur.blogspot.com.es/2013/04/six-ideas-to-save-eu.html

So, What's the Big Idea, European Union? https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/05/so-whats-the-big-idea-european-union

Three things the EU must do to survive: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/25/three-things-the-eu-must-do-to-survive

Coronavirus solutions: https://www.esm.europa.eu/content/europe-response-corona-crisis#esm%E2%80%99s_role_in_the_european_response

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/05/spanish-pm-survival-eu-rests-response-coronavirus-crisis
Putin has given birth to geopolitical Europe

domingo, 2 de abril de 2023

Eurovision Song Contest

2023: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/may/14/this-years-eurovision-was-a-political-statement-whatever-the-organisers-may-have-wanted https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2023-04/eurovision-war-and-geopolitics-pop 

2022: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-wins-eurovision-as-european-voters-show-song-contest-solidarity/

https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-48325868

https://www.euronews.com/2019/05/17/how-politics-is-the-elephant-in-the-room-at-eurovision


https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/music/eurovision-2018-sees-global-turmoil-take-centre-stage-1.3486014


https://www.politico.eu/article/13-times-eurovision-song-contest-got-political/


"As the most anticipated event of the 2016 calendar draws ever nearer, tensions are running high: people up and down the country are considering and re-considering their position, reflecting on our national identity, the intricacies of an aged voting system, our relationship with our European neighbours, and the result’s knock-on effect on the European referendum. Sorry – you thought I meant the European referendum? No, I’m talking about the 61st Eurovision Song Contest."
Siobhan Palmer (28 APRIL 2016)

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/tv/2016/04/26/is-eurovision-really-all-political-why-the-balkan-voting-bloc-is/

lunes, 16 de enero de 2023

Course Description

G1808 “EUROPEAN CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION”
(DIPLOMA IN SPANISH HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION, UNIVERSIDAD DE CANTABRIA)

ECTS
6
Taught by
Prof. Dr. Jesús Ángel González, gonzalezja@unican.es
Course language
English
Schedule
Classes: Wed 12:30-13:30, Thu 10:30-12:30
Content


The course will deal with the concepts of culture and European unity and diversity. Therefore, the different concepts of culture and the diverse dimensions of Europe (geographical, historical, religious, economic, cultural) will be analyzed and followed by an individual analysis of the culture and civilization of some specific European countries. The course will also present key facts about the creation and development of the European Union. Some of the topics to be covered are: Origin of the EU, how the EU works, monetary union, European issues and priorities, the EU in the world, current developments and future possibilities.
Assessment

-Class attendance and participation 10% (MINIMUM 80 %)
-Oral presentation 30% Students will choose one European country and prepare an oral presentations about its culture and civilization.. The presentations should last between 20 and 30 minutes and some of the following fields could be covered: Background, history, geography, languages, sociological overview, education, religion, economy, politics, the Media, cultural conflicts, cultural products (Literature, Cinema, Art). Special emphasis should be placed on each student’s field of expertise or University Major.
- Reading and Writing Assignments: 20 %: Students are expected to read a number of articles, discuss them in class and hand in article reviews. 
- Final paper: “What is then a European?" 40 %
Teaching methods
Participants will be encouraged to actively participate in class and share their experiences and ideas with others to explore new ways of thinking. The course will be conducted using a mixture of lectures; small group activities; practical exercises, facilitated discussions and oral presentations.
Teaching material




§  Core Texts: Class materials to be picked up by students at the Interfacultativo Copy Centre

§  Additional material:

Barbour, P. (Ed.) The European Union Handbook. Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers. 1996

Chernotsky, Harry & Heidi Hobbs. Crossing Borders: International Studies for the 21st Century.

        CQ Press, 2015. Díez Medrano, J. Framing Europe. Princeton University Press. 2003.

González López, Jesús A. An Introduction to North American Culture and Literature.

       Santander: TGD, 2006.

Harari, Yuval Noah. Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind. London: Penguin, 2011.

Hartley, Emma. 50 Facts you Need to Know: Europe. Icon Books: 2006.

Marshall, Tim. Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need To

       Know About Global Politics. London: Elliot & Thompson, 2015.

Oxford Guide to British and American Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Rifkin, Jeremy. The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream. London: Polity, 2005.



lunes, 11 de abril de 2022

Will Putin Kill the Global Economy? (Paul Krugman)

 

The New York Times. OPINION. PAUL KRUGMAN

Will Putin Kill the Global Economy?

March 31, 2022

Economic commentators always reach for historical analogies, and with good reason. For example, those who had studied past banking crises had a much better grasp of what was happening in 2008 than those who hadn’t. But there’s always the question of which analogy to choose.

Right now, many people are harking back to the stagflation of the 1970s. I’ve argued at some length that this is a bad parallel; our current inflation looks very different from what we saw in 1979-80, and probably much easier to end.

There are, however, good reasons to worry that we’re seeing an economic replay of 1914 — the year that ended what some economists call the first wave of globalization, a vast expansion of world trade made possible by railroads, steamships and telegraph cables.

In his 1919 book “The Economic Consequences of the Peace,” John Maynard Keynes — who would later teach us how to understand depressions — lamented what he saw, correctly, as the end of an era, “an extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man.” On the eve of World War I, he wrote, an inhabitant of London could easily order “the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep.”

But it was not to last, thanks to “the projects and politics of militarism and imperialism, of racial and cultural rivalries.” Sound familiar?

Keynes was right to see World War I as the end of an era for the global economy. To take one clearly relevant example, in 1913 the Russian empire was a huge wheat exporter; it would be three generations before some of the former republics of the Soviet Union resumed that role. And the second wave of globalization, with its world-spanning supply chains made possible by containerization and telecommunications, didn’t really get going until around 1990.

So are we about to see a second deglobalization? The answer, probably, is yes. And while there were important downsides to globalization as we knew it, there will be even starker consequences if, as I and many others fear, we see a significant rollback in world trade.

Why is world trade taking a hit? Vladimir Putin’s botched war of conquest has, of course, meant an end to wheat exports from Ukraine, and it probably cut off much of Russia’s sales, too. It’s not entirely clear how sharply Russia’s exports of oil and natural gas have been reduced; Europe has been reluctant to impose sanctions on imports of products on which, fecklessly, it allowed itself to become dependent, but the European Union is moving to end that dependence.

Wait, there’s more. You mightn’t have expected Putin’s war to have much of an effect on auto production. But modern cars include a lot of wiring, including a specialized part called a wire harness — and many of Europe’s wire harnesses, it turns out, are made in Ukraine. (In case you’re wondering, most U.S. wire harnesses are made in Mexico.)

Still, Russia’s decision to turn itself into an international pariah probably wouldn’t by itself be enough to drastically reduce world trade — as China, which plays a key role in many supply chains, could if it decided to turn inward.

But while Russia’s assault on Ukraine hasn’t inspired China to invade anyone (yet?), there are troubles on that front, too.

Most immediately, China’s Covid response, which was highly successful in the pandemic’s initial stages, is becoming an increasing source of economic disruption. The Chinese government still insists on using homegrown vaccines that don’t work very well, and it’s still responding to outbreaks with draconian lockdowns, which are causing problems not just for China but also for the rest of the world.

Beyond that, what Putin has taught us is that countries run by strongmen who surround themselves with yes-men aren’t reliable business partners. A Chinese confrontation with the West, economic or military, would be wildly irrational — but so was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Tellingly, the Ukraine war appears to have led to large-scale capital flight from … China.

So if you’re a business leader right now, surely you’re wondering whether it’s smart to stake your company’s future on the assumption that you’ll keep being able to buy what you need from authoritarian regimes. Bringing production back to nations that believe in the rule of law may raise your costs by a few percent, but the price may be worth it for the stability it buys.

If we are about to see a partial retreat from globalization, will that be a bad thing? Wealthy, advanced economies will end up only slightly poorer than they would have been otherwise; Britain managed to keep growing despite the decline in world trade after 1913. But I’m worried about the impact on nations that have made progress in recent decades but would be desperately poor without access to world markets — nations like Bangladesh, whose economic achievements have depended crucially on its garment exports.

Unfortunately, we’re relearning the lessons of World War I: The benefits of globalization are always at risk from the threat of war and the whims of dictators. To make the world durably richer, we need to make it safer.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/31/opinion/putin-global-economy.amp.html

miércoles, 2 de marzo de 2022

Russians and Ukrainians (The Economist)

 

Andrei Zorin, a professor of Russian at the University of Oxford, explains how national mythologies foment conflict

Russians see Ukrainians as brothers. But families sometimes break apart

Feb 22nd 2022 (The Economist)

Political leaders tend to believe that they take their own decisions. In fact, they are often dragged into action by the course of events, and enslaved by popular mythology that they themselves have promoted. With conflict looming between Russia and Ukraine, it is therefore important to understand the history of the two countries’ relationship. Fundamental differences exist between their historical mythologies, and between how they view themselves and each other.

In a televised address to the Russian nation on February 21st President Vladimir Putin all but declared war on the Ukrainian government in Kyiv. To the bewilderment of many observers, Mr Putin has recently become an amateur historian and started writing essays about Russia’s past. His address drew on the most important of those, published last summer, in which he insisted that Russians and Ukrainians are of the same Slavic nation. This revived thinking from before the revolution of 1917 which applied the term “Russian” indiscriminately to Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians. It defined them respectively as VelikorosyMalorosy and Belorusy (Great, Little and White Russians). The Soviet regime got rid of those titles, but retained and enhanced the traditional notion of “brotherly” relations between the countries, with Russians playing the role of elder brothers.

Today, when Russia and Ukraine are on the brink of a major war, that idea of kinship may seem preposterous. Yet few conflicts are as deep and irreconcilable as family feuds. The omens are especially bad when one of the “brothers” believes in his natural right to be in charge of the whole family and the other is independent-minded and rebellious. Remember the Bible, where human history begins with a fratricide.

The family tensions between Russia and Ukraine are aggravated by a dispute over their heritage. Russia’s understanding of history idealises Kyiv as “the mother of all Russian cities”, and the source of Russia’s religion, culture, alphabet and a network of dynastic and military connections. The huge statue of the Kievan prince Vladimir, who baptised Old Rus, was erected in 2016 near the entrance to the Kremlin. If this claim on Kyiv’s past were to be renounced, not only would Russian history be shorter by at least a quarter of a millennium, but Russia would also, more importantly, be deprived of its European identity.

Russia’s historical narrative is to a large extent defined by miraculous transformations that turn even the most humiliating defeats into apocalyptic triumphs. The traditional stories of major Russian wars–be it against the Poles in the 17th century, the Swedes in the 18th, the French in the 19th or the Germans in the 20th–all follow the same pattern. After initial defeats that put the country on the brink of utter ruin, a strong leader mobilises the nation and imposes a devastating defeat on the enemy.

Mr Putin appears to be exploiting this tradition. Over the past 20 years his propaganda has attempted to convince Russians that the collapse of the Soviet Union was not their country’s liberation from communist dictatorship but “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”. And that this was caused by dastardly Western intrigue. The implication is that this “catastrophe” should once again be turned into a glorious victory. That process supposedly started in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea. The reunification of the broken Slavic body, by bringing Belarus and Ukraine back under the protection of Great Russia, as the Kremlin imagines it, would crown Mr Putin’s triumph.

The Ukrainian identity could hardly be more different. It has been built in contradistinction to that of “Moscals”, as Ukrainians once called their northern neighbours. Whereas Russia’s historical narrative is built on the notion of a powerful autocrat, Ukrainian political imagination is shaped by the legacy of the Zaporozhskaya Sich. This Cossack military democracy navigated between three major powers–Russia, Poland and Turkey–for over 200 years and managed to sustain its own independence until the alliance with Moscow signed in 1654 by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky, the elected leader of the Sich, gradually sucked Ukraine into Russia’s orbit.

For more than three centuries Ukrainians made spectacular careers in Muscovy, the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, holding positions of ministers, church metropolitans, governors, generals and cult figures. Even today many leading Russian officials were born in Ukraine and carry distinctly Ukrainian surnames. The price of such successes was the suppression of the original Ukrainian national, cultural and linguistic specificity regarded in Russia as a sort of stubborn and eccentric superstition.

But nostalgia for that past independence was never fully extinguished. The ideal of the Zaporozhskaya Sich lingered on. It was present even in the hearts of communist apparatchiks, such as Leonid Kravchuk, the last leader of Soviet Ukraine and the man who took it into independence in 1991.

Russia’s leaders have never come to terms with the idea of Ukraine as a separate nation. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, they saw its drift towards the West as a betrayal of Russian-Ukrainian familial ties. And yet, however permanent such sentiments may seem, they have changed in the past.

Consider how Russian state and church propaganda accused the Poles of betraying the brotherhood of Slavic Orthodox nations following Polish uprisings in the 19th century. Russia accused the Poles of being seduced first by the Vatican and then by revolutionary France. At the same time, for liberal Russians critical of the authorities, Poland was the embodiment of the European world and thus a subject of adoration.

Today Poland is predominantly perceived in Russia as just another foreign country. Ukraine has replaced Poland in Russia’s consciousness and similarly divided Russian society. As with Poland in the 19th century, the jealous animosity that many Russians experience today towards their unfaithful “brothers” in Kyiv can be seen as the inchoate recognition of the Ukrainians as a separate nation.

History has unlimited resources to teach its lessons even to the most stubborn students. I am all but sure that the majority of Russians, and their leaders, will eventually learn to accept Ukrainian independence. Alas, that prediction will be of little comfort to those who have to bear the cost of their obstinacy today. 

Andrei Zorin is a professor of Russian at the University of Oxford.

jueves, 21 de enero de 2021