sábado, 5 de abril de 2025

Europe cannot fathom what Trumpian America wants from it (The Economist, April 3 2025)

Europe cannot fathom what Trumpian America wants from it: From tariffs to Ukraine, Europeans are stuck in the Fog of Peace 

Carl von Clausewitz, a 19th-century Prussian general, described warfare as “the realm of uncertainty”. The fellow never had to deal with an American administration run by Donald Trump. Forget the fog of war Clausewitz posited; Europe is discovering the perils of wading through the haze of Pax Americana, MAGA edition. Wish it luck. Being the biggest trading partner of a country that seeks “liberation” through tariffs, or a decades-long military ally of a superpower now parroting Kremlin talking points, is akin to inching through a geopolitical pea-souper. Europe is hardly alone in being flummoxed by Mr Trump (many Americans are, too). But it faces a unique problem: Europe cannot fathom what it should do to fix its already broken relationship with the new administration. Even if Europeans wanted to help their historical partner—a big “if” these days—disagreements abound as to what that partner wants.

The alliance with America has never been entirely straightforward. Yankee gripes about anaemic European military spending go back decades. A continent striving for ever-closer union was occasionally splintered into factions for American convenience, as when George W. Bush’s lot tried to pit “old Europe” against “new Europe” during the Gulf war. American regulators clobbered French and German firms with billion-dollar fines while decrying any constraints on their own tech giants doing business in the European Union. Even pro-European administrations wound up blindsiding the continent’s policymakers. In 2022 Joe Biden announced generous green-industry subsidies (Bravo!) which turned out to be closed to market-leading firms in Europe (Zut alors!).

But this time is different. The Trumpian top brass making decisions of great import to Europe—not least over the fate of Ukraine—hold America’s historical allies in startling contempt. In a recent leak from a not-so-secret Signal group of top officials, Europe was decried as “PATHETIC” by Pete Hegseth, the defence secretary. J.D. Vance was just as critical, though this was predictable after the vice-president had blasted Europeans at a conference in Munich in February. Mr Trump had himself set the tone, imagining that the EU had been set up with the sole intent to “screw” America. On April 2nd he whacked European imports with a tariff rate of 20%. Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, said she felt “let down by our oldest ally”.

Speaking to diplomats in Brussels and beyond, Charlemagne has heard three theories to explain MAGA hatred of Europe. Understanding which is correct matters, because each comes with its own set of remedies to assuage the Euro-bashers.

The first possibility is that Mr Trump simply shares his predecessors’ desire that Europeans bear the burden for their own defence, and feels unconstrained by diplomatic niceties in making the case. Barack Obama warned over a decade ago that America would “pivot to Asia” (ie, away from Europe and the Middle East) to address a Chinese threat that has since grown more acute. That did little to motivate Europe into spending more. By contrast, Trumpian goading—insulting as it might seem—has been effective at getting allies to step up. If scrimping on defence is indeed what troubles America, the solution is on its way: Europe will promise to spend much more on defence at a NATO summit in June.

The second theory of MAGA Euro-hostility is more worrying. According to this school, the invective directed at Europe is about more than freeloading on defence. After all, America’s Asian allies also underspend on their armed forces but are facing no such abuse. Rather, Europe is being punished for its crime of lèse-Amérique. By banging on about global norms, Europeans are an irritant to might-makes-right Trumpians. How dare the EU regulate Big Tech? How dare Denmark think Greenland would not be better off in American hands? Europe’s role should be to play second fiddle, or, better yet, pipe down. On this reading, to be a better ally, Europe would have to bend the knee, for example by helping constrain China at Washington’s behest. This may be humiliating, if not downright unrealistic in the case of ceding Greenland, which is not Denmark’s to give away. But seasoned EU diplomats think it may provide the basis for a fraught but workable relationship.

Yet some European officials perceive a third kind of MAGA animosity, one they are powerless to do anything about. For this contempt is aimed at a continent that exists only in the imagination of Fox News presenters (as Mr Hegseth once was). Europhobes of this type see it as a flailing continent on the economic skids, one bent on demographic suicide, where the only people who enjoy free speech are Muslim extremists imposing sharia on a woke populace. For them, Europe is a cautionary tale: what America might degenerate into without Mr Trump’s “help”. This fantastical vision offers Europe no way to indulge America, short of handing over power to the likes of Alternative for Germany, a Nazi-adjacent party bafflingly admired by Mr Vance.

Who do you think we are?

To be fair to the MAGA Euro-bashers, their spite towards Europe is reciprocated—as any leak of European leaders’ candid Signal chats about Mr Trump and his team would probably attest.
Without any certainty as to why they are loathed in Washington, Europeans are falling back on their old diplomatic instincts: keep engaging and don’t despair. Sometimes it works. On March 29th Alexander Stubb, Finland’s president, spent hours playing golf with Mr Trump at Mar-a-Lago. Soon after, Mr Trump declared himself “pissed off” with Russia’s Vladimir Putin for failing to agree to a ceasefire in Ukraine—a useful win for Europe. Many hope America might still give concrete support to a Europe-led “reassurance force” in Ukraine. Occasionally, the two old allies still manage to find one another, through the bitter mist

martes, 18 de febrero de 2025

PRESENTATION CALENDAR 2024-2025

 

Date

Student

Country

Tutorial

March 19

Daniel

Iceland

February 26

12:30

March 25

Aidan

Portugal

February 26

12:45

April 2

James

Switzerland

March 5

12:30

April 3

Peyton

Greece

February 26

13:00

April 16

Eliska

Czech Republic

March 5

12:45

April 30

Zofia

Poland

March 5

13:00

May 7

Doan

France

March 12

12:30

May 14

Ross

Armenia

March 12

12:45

May 21

Evie

Finland

March 12

13:00

May 8

Till

Serbia

February 26

13:15

May 15

Mia

Sweden

March 5

13:15

May 22

Elsa

Rumania

March 12

13:15

miércoles, 15 de enero de 2025

Course Description

G1808 “EUROPEAN CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION”
(DIPLOMA IN SPANISH HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION, UNIVERSIDAD DE CANTABRIA)

ECTS
6
Taught by
Prof. Dr. Jesús Ángel González, gonzalezja@unican.es
Course language
English
Schedule
Classes: Wed 12:30-13:30, Thu 10:30-12:30
Content


The course will deal with the concepts of culture and European unity and diversity. Therefore, the different concepts of culture and the diverse dimensions of Europe (geographical, historical, religious, economic, cultural) will be analyzed and followed by an individual analysis of the culture and civilization of some specific European countries. The course will also present key facts about the creation and development of the European Union. Some of the topics to be covered are: Origin of the EU, how the EU works, monetary union, European issues and priorities, the EU in the world, current developments and future possibilities.
Assessment

-Class attendance and participation 10% (MINIMUM 80 %)
-Oral presentation 30% Students will choose one European country and prepare an oral presentations about its culture and civilization.. The presentations should last between 20 and 30 minutes and some of the following fields could be covered: Background, history, geography, languages, sociological overview, education, religion, economy, politics, the Media, cultural conflicts, cultural products (Literature, Cinema, Art). Special emphasis should be placed on each student’s field of expertise or University Major.
- Reading and Writing Assignments: 20 %: Students are expected to read a number of articles, discuss them in class and hand in article reviews. 
- Final paper: “What is then a European?" 40 %
Teaching methods
Participants will be encouraged to actively participate in class and share their experiences and ideas with others to explore new ways of thinking. The course will be conducted using a mixture of lectures; small group activities; practical exercises, facilitated discussions and oral presentations.
Teaching material




§  Core Texts: Class materials to be picked up by students at the Interfacultativo Copy Centre

§  Additional material:

Barbour, P. (Ed.) The European Union Handbook. Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers. 1996

Chernotsky, Harry & Heidi Hobbs. Crossing Borders: International Studies for the 21st Century.

        CQ Press, 2015. Díez Medrano, J. Framing Europe. Princeton University Press. 2003.

González López, Jesús A. An Introduction to North American Culture and Literature.

       Santander: TGD, 2006.

Harari, Yuval Noah. Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind. London: Penguin, 2011.

Hartley, Emma. 50 Facts you Need to Know: Europe. Icon Books: 2006.

Marshall, Tim. Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need To

       Know About Global Politics. London: Elliot & Thompson, 2015.

Oxford Guide to British and American Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Rifkin, Jeremy. The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream. London: Polity, 2005.



viernes, 12 de abril de 2024

Why most people regret Brexit: A majority of British voters now believe the split was a mistake

 

A majority of British voters now believe the split was a mistake

Apr 11th 2024| (The Economist)

It is rare for voters to change their minds soon after referendums. Experience from Canada to Scotland, from Norway to Switzerland, suggests rather that opinions tend to move in favour of a referendum result more than they swing against it. But Brexit seems to be an exception. Since the 52-48% vote in favour of leaving the European Union in June 2016, the majority view among Britons has shifted, and especially so in the past two years, towards the conclusion that the decision was wrong (see chart).



One way to take the temperature is to visit two English towns called Richmond which voted in very different ways in 2016. In Richmond-upon-Thames in London, which voted 69-31% to remain in the eu, opinion has hardened. Gareth Roberts, the Liberal Democrat council leader, notes that post-Brexit niggles such as longer border delays and more intrusive passport controls have helped to solidify local opposition. A Leave voter sitting by the river says he has not changed his mind, but that he is disappointed by the Tories’ failure to strike big trade deals outside the eu.

The other Richmond, in north Yorkshire, voted 57-43% for Brexit. One Leaver in the market square echoes his southern counterpart by insisting that he still supports Brexit but he complains that it has not been properly done and that immigration has surged despite repeated Tory promises to reduce it. A local bartender says that she voted instinctively to leave but that, were the referendum re-run, she would work harder to understand what it would really mean. Stuart Parsons, a former mayor of Richmond, claims that several friends have changed their minds, especially small farmers who feel betrayed by the Conservatives and now fret about future lost public subsidies.

Such anecdotes chime with polls across the country. Research by uk in a Changing Europe (ukice), a think-tank, finds that most voters have not in fact changed their minds since 2016. But because as many as 16-20% of those who voted to leave have switched sides, compared with only 6% of those who voted to remain, the balance has swung against Brexit. The passage of time is also having its inevitable effect: older voters were overwhelmingly keen to leave the eu and younger ones were fiercely opposed to the idea. Don’t-knows and those who did not vote in 2016 now tend to break strongly against Brexit.

Explanations abound for the disillusionment. Sir John Curtice, a leading pollster who works with ukice, points especially to gloom about the economy since 2016, which he says matters more than irritation over immigration. Sarah Olney, the Liberal Democrat mp for Richmond Park, reckons that outright dishonesty on the part of the Leave campaign is to blame. Peter Kellner, a political pundit and former president of YouGov, a polling group, suggests that many Brexit supporters had no idea what would happen if they actually won. That differs sharply from the run-up to most other constitutional referendums.

Changes in the political background matter as well. The Conservatives under Rishi Sunak, who happens to be the mp for Richmond in Yorkshire and is a keen supporter of Brexit, are associated in voters’ minds with the decision to Leave. Party disunity and the chaos of four prime ministers in five years have helped to discredit something with which the Tories are strongly identified.

Just as the Tories have helped tarnish views of Brexit, so Brexit is likely to hurt the Tories at the next election. A chunk of people who voted Leave in 2016 say there should still be long-term benefits from quitting the bloc but argue that too little has been done to realise them. This group now leans against the Tories and may even prefer the Reform Party, an insurgent right-wing party. In contrast, those who were against Brexit in 2016 think they were right to fear its economic impact; many who were Tory then now back Labour.

The anti-Brexit mood of a majority of voters is clear but that does not translate into a burning wish to refight old battles. Brexit may be unpopular but its political salience has faded. Even keen Remainers have doubts about the wisdom of starting a lengthy campaign to rejoin. The Labour Party’s decision to talk as little as possible about Brexit is understandable: the party hopes to regain “red-wall” seats in the north and the Midlands that backed Brexit in 2016 and then voted Tory in the 2019 general election.

But if and when Labour does take office, there will be political wriggle-room to improve relations with the eu. Some in the party talk not just of expanding today’s thin trade deal but of broader alignment with European rules. Tory attacks on such ideas as a betrayal of the 2016 vote are less likely to resonate when Brexit itself has lost its appeal for many.

jueves, 21 de enero de 2021