Why most people regret Brexit: A majority of British voters now believe the split was a mistake

 

A majority of British voters now believe the split was a mistake

Apr 11th 2024| (The Economist)

It is rare for voters to change their minds soon after referendums. Experience from Canada to Scotland, from Norway to Switzerland, suggests rather that opinions tend to move in favour of a referendum result more than they swing against it. But Brexit seems to be an exception. Since the 52-48% vote in favour of leaving the European Union in June 2016, the majority view among Britons has shifted, and especially so in the past two years, towards the conclusion that the decision was wrong (see chart).

One way to take the temperature is to visit two English towns called Richmond which voted in very different ways in 2016. In Richmond-upon-Thames in London, which voted 69-31% to remain in the eu, opinion has hardened. Gareth Roberts, the Liberal Democrat council leader, notes that post-Brexit niggles such as longer border delays and more intrusive passport controls have helped to solidify local opposition. A Leave voter sitting by the river says he has not changed his mind, but that he is disappointed by the Tories’ failure to strike big trade deals outside the eu.

The other Richmond, in north Yorkshire, voted 57-43% for Brexit. One Leaver in the market square echoes his southern counterpart by insisting that he still supports Brexit but he complains that it has not been properly done and that immigration has surged despite repeated Tory promises to reduce it. A local bartender says that she voted instinctively to leave but that, were the referendum re-run, she would work harder to understand what it would really mean. Stuart Parsons, a former mayor of Richmond, claims that several friends have changed their minds, especially small farmers who feel betrayed by the Conservatives and now fret about future lost public subsidies.

Such anecdotes chime with polls across the country. Research by uk in a Changing Europe (ukice), a think-tank, finds that most voters have not in fact changed their minds since 2016. But because as many as 16-20% of those who voted to leave have switched sides, compared with only 6% of those who voted to remain, the balance has swung against Brexit. The passage of time is also having its inevitable effect: older voters were overwhelmingly keen to leave the eu and younger ones were fiercely opposed to the idea. Don’t-knows and those who did not vote in 2016 now tend to break strongly against Brexit.

Explanations abound for the disillusionment. Sir John Curtice, a leading pollster who works with ukice, points especially to gloom about the economy since 2016, which he says matters more than irritation over immigration. Sarah Olney, the Liberal Democrat mp for Richmond Park, reckons that outright dishonesty on the part of the Leave campaign is to blame. Peter Kellner, a political pundit and former president of YouGov, a polling group, suggests that many Brexit supporters had no idea what would happen if they actually won. That differs sharply from the run-up to most other constitutional referendums.

Changes in the political background matter as well. The Conservatives under Rishi Sunak, who happens to be the mp for Richmond in Yorkshire and is a keen supporter of Brexit, are associated in voters’ minds with the decision to Leave. Party disunity and the chaos of four prime ministers in five years have helped to discredit something with which the Tories are strongly identified.

Just as the Tories have helped tarnish views of Brexit, so Brexit is likely to hurt the Tories at the next election. A chunk of people who voted Leave in 2016 say there should still be long-term benefits from quitting the bloc but argue that too little has been done to realise them. This group now leans against the Tories and may even prefer the Reform Party, an insurgent right-wing party. In contrast, those who were against Brexit in 2016 think they were right to fear its economic impact; many who were Tory then now back Labour.

The anti-Brexit mood of a majority of voters is clear but that does not translate into a burning wish to refight old battles. Brexit may be unpopular but its political salience has faded. Even keen Remainers have doubts about the wisdom of starting a lengthy campaign to rejoin. The Labour Party’s decision to talk as little as possible about Brexit is understandable: the party hopes to regain “red-wall” seats in the north and the Midlands that backed Brexit in 2016 and then voted Tory in the 2019 general election.

But if and when Labour does take office, there will be political wriggle-room to improve relations with the eu. Some in the party talk not just of expanding today’s thin trade deal but of broader alignment with European rules. Tory attacks on such ideas as a betrayal of the 2016 vote are less likely to resonate when Brexit itself has lost its appeal for many.■

Presentations Calendar

 

UK and the European Union

Read these articles: 

1)article 27 (Britain and the European Union) (outdated but good)

2)Brexit: All you need to know about the UK leaving the EU (BBC)

3) Brexit, the most pointless, masochistic ambition in our country's history, is done (Ian McEwan)

4) For Europe, the Brexit deal makes the best of a bad business (The Economist)

Watch: 

5) Brexit explained for confused Americans (WT)

Update: Post-Brexit Guide (Euronews)

Latest update: The Northern Ireland Protocol and Windsor Framework 

Complementary materials: 

Better Off Out or In?  (BBC)

Brexit with John Oliver (1)

Brexit with John Oliver (2)

Brexit with John Oliver (3)

Brexit explained (CNN)

Timothy Garton Ash

Soft power: The Brussels Effect

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brussels_effect#:~:text=The%20Brussels%20effect%20is%20the,its%20borders%20through%20market%20mechanisms.

European Movement International

https://europeanmovement.eu/

EU Enlargement

EU Enlargement Will the EU get new members soon? Here’s what you need to know.

"Social eating"

https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2017-03-16-social-eating-connects-communities

Football and European identity

https://ruvid.org/ri-world/football-as-a-key-factor-in-shaping-a-unified-european-identity/

Germany’s Scholz says EU must reform before it can admit Ukraine

https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-scholz-say-eu-reform-admit-ukraine/

Homework for April 11: The Great Spanish Crash (BBC)

Watch this documentary and bring a concept map to class:

The Great Spanish Crash 

A couple of examples of concept maps here: https://learningcenter.unc.edu/tips-and-tools/using-concept-maps/

Links about Spanish Character

Spain – A great place to live, a terrible place to work? 

How to Be Spanish (The Times)

Spanish rude expressions

Extranjeros sobre España (Huffington Post)

Estereotipos españoles (Huggington Post)

Course Description

G1808 “EUROPEAN CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION”

(DIPLOMA IN SPANISH HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION, UNIVERSIDAD DE CANTABRIA)

ECTS	6
Taught by	Prof. Dr. Jesús Ángel González, gonzalezja@unican.es Class Blog: http://europeancultureandcivilization.blogspot.com/
Course language	English
Schedule	Classes: Wed 12:30-13:30, Thu 10:30-12:30
Content	The course will deal with the concepts of culture and European unity and diversity. Therefore, the different concepts of culture and the diverse dimensions of Europe (geographical, historical, religious, economic, cultural) will be analyzed and followed by an individual analysis of the culture and civilization of some specific European countries. The course will also present key facts about the creation and development of the European Union. Some of the topics to be covered are: Origin of the EU, how the EU works, monetary union, European issues and priorities, the EU in the world, current developments and future possibilities.
Assessment	-Class attendance and participation 10% (MINIMUM 80 %) -Oral presentation 30% Students will choose one European country and prepare an oral presentations about its culture and civilization.. The presentations should last between 20 and 30 minutes and some of the following fields could be covered: Background, history, geography, languages, sociological overview, education, religion, economy, politics, the Media, cultural conflicts, cultural products (Literature, Cinema, Art). Special emphasis should be placed on each student’s field of expertise or University Major. - Reading and Writing Assignments: 20 %: Students are expected to read a number of articles, discuss them in class and hand in article reviews.  - Final paper: “What is then a European?" 40 %
Teaching methods	Participants will be encouraged to actively participate in class and share their experiences and ideas with others to explore new ways of thinking. The course will be conducted using a mixture of lectures; small group activities; practical exercises, facilitated discussions and oral presentations.
Teaching material	§  Core Texts: Class materials to be picked up by students at the Interfacultativo Copy Centre §  Additional material: Barbour, P. (Ed.) The European Union Handbook. Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers. 1996 Chernotsky, Harry & Heidi Hobbs. Crossing Borders: International Studies for the 21st Century.         CQ Press, 2015. Díez Medrano, J. Framing Europe. Princeton University Press. 2003. González López, Jesús A. An Introduction to North American Culture and Literature.        Santander: TGD, 2006. Harari, Yuval Noah. Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind. London: Penguin, 2011. Hartley, Emma. 50 Facts you Need to Know: Europe. Icon Books: 2006. Marshall, Tim. Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need To        Know About Global Politics. London: Elliot & Thompson, 2015. Oxford Guide to British and American Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Rifkin, Jeremy. The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream. London: Polity, 2005.

Alcohol Death Rates

https://twitter.com/simongerman600/status/1528134802859126785/photo/1

Putin's War Has Given Birth to Geopolitical Europe (JOSEP BORRELL)

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/geopolitical-europe-responds-to-russias-war-by-josep-borrell-2022-03

Will Putin Kill the Global Economy? (Paul Krugman)

 

The New York Times. OPINION. PAUL KRUGMAN

Will Putin Kill the Global Economy?

March 31, 2022

Economic commentators always reach for historical analogies, and with good reason. For example, those who had studied past banking crises had a much better grasp of what was happening in 2008 than those who hadn’t. But there’s always the question of which analogy to choose.

Right now, many people are harking back to the stagflation of the 1970s. I’ve argued at some length that this is a bad parallel; our current inflation looks very different from what we saw in 1979-80, and probably much easier to end.

There are, however, good reasons to worry that we’re seeing an economic replay of 1914 — the year that ended what some economists call the first wave of globalization, a vast expansion of world trade made possible by railroads, steamships and telegraph cables.

In his 1919 book “The Economic Consequences of the Peace,” John Maynard Keynes — who would later teach us how to understand depressions — lamented what he saw, correctly, as the end of an era, “an extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man.” On the eve of World War I, he wrote, an inhabitant of London could easily order “the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep.”

But it was not to last, thanks to “the projects and politics of militarism and imperialism, of racial and cultural rivalries.” Sound familiar?

Keynes was right to see World War I as the end of an era for the global economy. To take one clearly relevant example, in 1913 the Russian empire was a huge wheat exporter; it would be three generations before some of the former republics of the Soviet Union resumed that role. And the second wave of globalization, with its world-spanning supply chains made possible by containerization and telecommunications, didn’t really get going until around 1990.

So are we about to see a second deglobalization? The answer, probably, is yes. And while there were important downsides to globalization as we knew it, there will be even starker consequences if, as I and many others fear, we see a significant rollback in world trade.

Why is world trade taking a hit? Vladimir Putin’s botched war of conquest has, of course, meant an end to wheat exports from Ukraine, and it probably cut off much of Russia’s sales, too. It’s not entirely clear how sharply Russia’s exports of oil and natural gas have been reduced; Europe has been reluctant to impose sanctions on imports of products on which, fecklessly, it allowed itself to become dependent, but the European Union is moving to end that dependence.

Wait, there’s more. You mightn’t have expected Putin’s war to have much of an effect on auto production. But modern cars include a lot of wiring, including a specialized part called a wire harness — and many of Europe’s wire harnesses, it turns out, are made in Ukraine. (In case you’re wondering, most U.S. wire harnesses are made in Mexico.)

Still, Russia’s decision to turn itself into an international pariah probably wouldn’t by itself be enough to drastically reduce world trade — as China, which plays a key role in many supply chains, could if it decided to turn inward.

But while Russia’s assault on Ukraine hasn’t inspired China to invade anyone (yet?), there are troubles on that front, too.

Most immediately, China’s Covid response, which was highly successful in the pandemic’s initial stages, is becoming an increasing source of economic disruption. The Chinese government still insists on using homegrown vaccines that don’t work very well, and it’s still responding to outbreaks with draconian lockdowns, which are causing problems not just for China but also for the rest of the world.

Beyond that, what Putin has taught us is that countries run by strongmen who surround themselves with yes-men aren’t reliable business partners. A Chinese confrontation with the West, economic or military, would be wildly irrational — but so was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Tellingly, the Ukraine war appears to have led to large-scale capital flight from … China.

So if you’re a business leader right now, surely you’re wondering whether it’s smart to stake your company’s future on the assumption that you’ll keep being able to buy what you need from authoritarian regimes. Bringing production back to nations that believe in the rule of law may raise your costs by a few percent, but the price may be worth it for the stability it buys.

If we are about to see a partial retreat from globalization, will that be a bad thing? Wealthy, advanced economies will end up only slightly poorer than they would have been otherwise; Britain managed to keep growing despite the decline in world trade after 1913. But I’m worried about the impact on nations that have made progress in recent decades but would be desperately poor without access to world markets — nations like Bangladesh, whose economic achievements have depended crucially on its garment exports.

Unfortunately, we’re relearning the lessons of World War I: The benefits of globalization are always at risk from the threat of war and the whims of dictators. To make the world durably richer, we need to make it safer.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/31/opinion/putin-global-economy.amp.html

Why Vladimir Putin has already lost this war (Yuval Noah Harari)

 Why Vladimir Putin has already lost this war

Russians and Ukrainians (The Economist)

 

Andrei Zorin, a professor of Russian at the University of Oxford, explains how national mythologies foment conflict

Russians see Ukrainians as brothers. But families sometimes break apart

Feb 22nd 2022 (The Economist)

Political leaders tend to believe that they take their own decisions. In fact, they are often dragged into action by the course of events, and enslaved by popular mythology that they themselves have promoted. With conflict looming between Russia and Ukraine, it is therefore important to understand the history of the two countries’ relationship. Fundamental differences exist between their historical mythologies, and between how they view themselves and each other.

In a televised address to the Russian nation on February 21st President Vladimir Putin all but declared war on the Ukrainian government in Kyiv. To the bewilderment of many observers, Mr Putin has recently become an amateur historian and started writing essays about Russia’s past. His address drew on the most important of those, published last summer, in which he insisted that Russians and Ukrainians are of the same Slavic nation. This revived thinking from before the revolution of 1917 which applied the term “Russian” indiscriminately to Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians. It defined them respectively as Velikorosy, Malorosy and Belorusy (Great, Little and White Russians). The Soviet regime got rid of those titles, but retained and enhanced the traditional notion of “brotherly” relations between the countries, with Russians playing the role of elder brothers.

Today, when Russia and Ukraine are on the brink of a major war, that idea of kinship may seem preposterous. Yet few conflicts are as deep and irreconcilable as family feuds. The omens are especially bad when one of the “brothers” believes in his natural right to be in charge of the whole family and the other is independent-minded and rebellious. Remember the Bible, where human history begins with a fratricide.

The family tensions between Russia and Ukraine are aggravated by a dispute over their heritage. Russia’s understanding of history idealises Kyiv as “the mother of all Russian cities”, and the source of Russia’s religion, culture, alphabet and a network of dynastic and military connections. The huge statue of the Kievan prince Vladimir, who baptised Old Rus, was erected in 2016 near the entrance to the Kremlin. If this claim on Kyiv’s past were to be renounced, not only would Russian history be shorter by at least a quarter of a millennium, but Russia would also, more importantly, be deprived of its European identity.

Russia’s historical narrative is to a large extent defined by miraculous transformations that turn even the most humiliating defeats into apocalyptic triumphs. The traditional stories of major Russian wars–be it against the Poles in the 17th century, the Swedes in the 18th, the French in the 19th or the Germans in the 20th–all follow the same pattern. After initial defeats that put the country on the brink of utter ruin, a strong leader mobilises the nation and imposes a devastating defeat on the enemy.

Mr Putin appears to be exploiting this tradition. Over the past 20 years his propaganda has attempted to convince Russians that the collapse of the Soviet Union was not their country’s liberation from communist dictatorship but “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”. And that this was caused by dastardly Western intrigue. The implication is that this “catastrophe” should once again be turned into a glorious victory. That process supposedly started in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea. The reunification of the broken Slavic body, by bringing Belarus and Ukraine back under the protection of Great Russia, as the Kremlin imagines it, would crown Mr Putin’s triumph.

The Ukrainian identity could hardly be more different. It has been built in contradistinction to that of “Moscals”, as Ukrainians once called their northern neighbours. Whereas Russia’s historical narrative is built on the notion of a powerful autocrat, Ukrainian political imagination is shaped by the legacy of the Zaporozhskaya Sich. This Cossack military democracy navigated between three major powers–Russia, Poland and Turkey–for over 200 years and managed to sustain its own independence until the alliance with Moscow signed in 1654 by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky, the elected leader of the Sich, gradually sucked Ukraine into Russia’s orbit.

For more than three centuries Ukrainians made spectacular careers in Muscovy, the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, holding positions of ministers, church metropolitans, governors, generals and cult figures. Even today many leading Russian officials were born in Ukraine and carry distinctly Ukrainian surnames. The price of such successes was the suppression of the original Ukrainian national, cultural and linguistic specificity regarded in Russia as a sort of stubborn and eccentric superstition.

But nostalgia for that past independence was never fully extinguished. The ideal of the Zaporozhskaya Sich lingered on. It was present even in the hearts of communist apparatchiks, such as Leonid Kravchuk, the last leader of Soviet Ukraine and the man who took it into independence in 1991.

Russia’s leaders have never come to terms with the idea of Ukraine as a separate nation. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, they saw its drift towards the West as a betrayal of Russian-Ukrainian familial ties. And yet, however permanent such sentiments may seem, they have changed in the past.

Consider how Russian state and church propaganda accused the Poles of betraying the brotherhood of Slavic Orthodox nations following Polish uprisings in the 19th century. Russia accused the Poles of being seduced first by the Vatican and then by revolutionary France. At the same time, for liberal Russians critical of the authorities, Poland was the embodiment of the European world and thus a subject of adoration.

Today Poland is predominantly perceived in Russia as just another foreign country. Ukraine has replaced Poland in Russia’s consciousness and similarly divided Russian society. As with Poland in the 19th century, the jealous animosity that many Russians experience today towards their unfaithful “brothers” in Kyiv can be seen as the inchoate recognition of the Ukrainians as a separate nation.

History has unlimited resources to teach its lessons even to the most stubborn students. I am all but sure that the majority of Russians, and their leaders, will eventually learn to accept Ukrainian independence. Alas, that prediction will be of little comfort to those who have to bear the cost of their obstinacy today. ■

Andrei Zorin is a professor of Russian at the University of Oxford.

The European Union and Vaccines

 Where Europe Went Wrong in Its Vaccine Rollout, and Why (The New York Times)

How Europe has mishandled the pandemic (The Economist)

ARTICLE/CHAPTER REVIEW

TITLE
AUTHOR
READ BY
DATE
MAIN POINT(S)
INTERESTING IDEAS/DATA	- - - -
PERSONAL OPINION

Irish unification is becoming likelier

https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/02/13/irish-unification-is-becoming-likelier

https://www.economist.com/briefing/2020/02/13/brexit-and-sinn-feins-success-boost-talk-of-irish-unification

Presentations (30 %)

Students will choose one European country and prepare an oral presentation about its culture and civilization. The presentations should last around 20-30 minutes and some of the following fields could be covered: Background, history (5 meaningful events only), geography, languages, sociological overview, education, religion, economy, politics, the Media, cultural conflicts, cultural products (Literature, Cinema, Art), role in Europe. Special emphasis should be placed on cultural conflicts and on each student’s field of expertise (preferably their University Major).You need to choose a country and a date as soon as possible and then you have to attend one of the Wednesday tutorials to let me know about your ideas about the presentation.


How to give a presentation in English: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXVoT7VMCpM

5 steps to a killer opener: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEDcc0aCjaA

After delivering your presentation in class, you have to upload it on the internet and send a link as a comment to this post (as in the models).


This is a guide to different slide-sharing services:http://www.masternewmedia.org/where-to-upload-and-share-powerpoint-presentations-guide/

Reading and Writing Assignments (20%)

Students are expected to read the articles provided by the teacher in paper format, present some of them in class (when scheduled) and hand in (via Moodle) 10 article reviews (5-8 from the list in the class materials and 2-5 from the blog: 20 % of the final mark). 

Final paper (40 %)

Deadline for the final paper: June 8th.

The final paper should be 5-10 pages long (2,000-4,000 words) and should involve some research as well as personal opinions. Don't forget to quote your sources and include a bibliography.You will find useful articles and book extracts in the set of photocopies as well as in the blog.

The topic of the final paper is "What is then a European?"in response to J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur's definition of Americans: “What is then the American, this new man? He is either a European or the descendant of a European, hence that strange mixture of blood, which you will find in no other country… He is an American, who, leaving behind him all his ancient prejudices and manners, receives new ones from the new mode of life he has embraced, the new government he obeys, and the new rank he holds. He becomes an American by being received in the broad lap of our great Alma Mater. Here individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of men, whose labors and posterity will one day cause great changes in the world … The American is a new man, who acts upon new principles; he must therefore entertain new ideas, and form new opinions.
(J. HECTOR ST. JOHN DE CRÈVECOEUR Letters from an American Farmer, 1782)

American history and character have been fundamentally shaped by three important myths:

· The American Dream: the belief that their country offers the best opportunities for a good and successful life. A dream of freedom and opportunities. Anybody can get rich, anybody can become president. But there are some American nightmares, as many writers and film directors keep pointing out ...

· The Melting Pot: a phrase used to describe the USA as a country in which people from many different races and cultures are ‘melted’ together to form the American people.

· The Manifest Destiny, as we have already mentioned, is a phrase coined in the late 19^th century to justify the right of the US to own and occupy land across the continent to the Pacific Ocean, buying or stealing land from Europeans, Indians, Mexicans (California, Texas,...) or Spaniards (the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Cuba). This idea is linked to the concept of the frontier (the border between settlements and wilderness), which has had a tremendous influence in the American psyche as shown in American popular culture (westerns).

These three myths are still alive in many ways and their effects can be seen in aspects such as the way the economy is handled (an extension of the concepts inherent to the American Dream), the problems with immigration and the ‘English Only’ movement (the Melting Pot), North-American foreign policy in Latin America (the Manifest Destiny), individualism, love of guns, the permanent conflict between nature and civilization or even the space race (the frontier).

Adapting these ideas to the European context, you can try to answer the following questions:

- What is then a European? is there such a thing as a European identity? How is it created? (You may think of the European Union and the monetary union, but also of the Council of Europe and other identity-forming elements like the Erasmus program, the Schengen agreement, the Cultural Capital of Europe, or even UEFA and the Eurovision song contest)

- What are the different European dimensions or ways to understand Europe? Think about Geography, History, Languages, Religion, Politics, Foreign Policy, Economy, Human Rights, etc.

- Is there a European Dream? What is it made of? Is it similar to the American Dream? Is there a social dimension vs. the more individualistic American dream?

- Is there a European Melting Pot? Should there be one? Is European diversity an asset or a curse? How should Europe deal with immigration (both from inside Europe and from outside Europe)?

- Is there a European Manifest Destiny? Was there one (in the 19th century colonialization period, for example)? How should Europe expand its influence outside its borders (think, for example, of democracy, human rights, prosperity, protection of the environment, the destruction of borders as a recipe for peace, the so-called social market...)?

- Think of your own experience: Do you have a European identity? Do you feel more European after your Erasmus experience? 

Democracy Index

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index

Rule of Law Index

Eurobarometer

http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsurveydetail/instruments/standard/surveyky/2215

UK: North and South

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PT0ay9u1gg4

Javier Solana: EU First

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/europe-defend-liberal-multilateralism-by-javier-solana-2017-02